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THE WAR ON SHELTERED WORKSHOPS: WILL
ADA TITLE II DISCRIMINATION LAWSUITS
TERMINATE AN EMPLOYMENT OPTION FOR
ADULTS WITH DISABILITIES?
J. Gardner Armsby*
INTRODUCTION
V.J. Trombley is an adult woman with a developmental disability
who lives in the North Country of New York, a region where
employment can be scarce.1 But work has not been a problem for
V.J., who has worked a job that she loves for the last twenty years.2
V.J. works at Essex Industries alongside others with disabilities,
building seats and other parts for canoes sold by retailers such as L.L.
Bean.3 In 2011, there were 52,7594 adults with disabilities employed
in sheltered workshops, defined as “facility-based day programs
attended by adults with disabilities as an alternative to working in the
open labor market.”5 However, the jobs that have provided gainful
employment for V.J. and her coworkers for so many years may soon
disappear entirely.6 Though this sounds like the usual story of
outsourcing, these jobs are actually under attack by a campaign to
eliminate sheltered workshops led by disability rights advocates and
the federal government.7

*
J.D. Candidate 2015, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to thank the
members of the Georgia State University Law Review and the College of Law faculty for all of their
guidance in this endeavor.
1. Rick Karlin, Sheltered Workshops Are in Midst of a Storm: Advocates for People with
Disabilities Fear Closures, TIMES UNION (Jul. 20, 2013), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/
Sheltered-workshops-are-in-midst-of-a-storm-4677272.php.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. JOHN BUTTERWORTH ET AL., INST. FOR CMTY. INCLUSION, UNIV. OF MASS. BOSTON,
STATEDATA: THE NATIONAL REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT SERVICES AND OUTCOMES 25 (2012), available
at http://communityinclusion.github.io/book12/pdf/bluebook2012_final.pdf.
5. Alberto Migliore, Sheltered Workshops, INT’L. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REHABILITATION,
http://cirrie.buffalo.edu/encyclopedia/en/article/136/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2014).
6. See Karlin, supra note 1.
7. Id.
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The National Disability Rights Network (NDRN) issued reports in
2011 and 2012 calling for an end to sheltered workshops under the
premise that adults with disabilities are “segregated and exploited.”8
NDRN and other opponents call for replacing sheltered workshops
with integrated employment options such as supported employment.9
The Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) also favors moving toward supported employment.10
However, supported employment is not a panacea because a
substantial percentage of adults with disabilities are not able to
maintain competitive employment through supported employment
programs.11 A complete elimination of sheltered workshops could
have the unintended consequence of leaving many of the 52,75912
adults in sheltered workshops with no work options.
The attack on sheltered workshops has already resulted in some
states eliminating or beginning to phase out funding.13 In two
8. NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, Beyond Segregated and Exploited: Update on the
Employment of People with Disabilities 3 (last updated July 2013), http://www.ndrn.org/images/
Documents/Resources/Publications/Reports/Beyond_Segregated_and_Exploited.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L
DISABILITY RTS. NETWORK, Beyond Segregated and Exploited]; NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK,
Segregated & Exploited: The Failure of the Disability Service System to Provide Quality Work 3 (Jan.
2011), http://www.ndrn.org/images/Documents/Resources/Publications/Reports/Segregated-andExploited.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L DISABILITY RTS. NETWORK, Segregated and Exploited].
9. See, e.g., Laura C. Hoffman, An Employment Opportunity or a Discrimination Dilemma?:
Sheltered Workshops and the Employment of the Disabled, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 151, 157,
175, 179 (2013); Susan Stefan, Beyond Residential Segregation: The Application of Olmstead to
Segregated Employment Settings, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 875, 879–80 (2010); NAT’L DISABILITY RTS.
NETWORK, Segregated & Exploited, supra note 8, at 46–47. In supported employment services, the
individual works in an integrated community setting alongside nondisabled coworkers, earns a
competitive wage, and receives ongoing services from trained professionals needed to support and
maintain employment. 34 C.F.R. § 361.5(b)(53)–(54) (2014).
10. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Div.,
United States Dep’t of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at Case Western Reserve Univ. School
of Law: Olmstead Goes to Work 12–15 (Mar. 15, 2011), available at http://www.ada.gov/
olmstead/documents/bagenstos_speech_cwru.pdf.
11. See Gary R. Bond et al., Generalizability of the Individual Placement and Support (IPS) Model
of Supported Employment Outside the US, 11 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 32, 34 (2012) (averaging the results
of fifteen supported employment programs, the competitive employment rate was 58.9%); Deborah
Becker et al., Long-Term Employment Trajectories Among Participants With Severe Mental Illness in
Supported Employment, 58 NO. 7 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 922, 925 (2007), available at
http://ps.psychiatryonline.org/data/Journals/PSS/3809/07ps922.pdf (publishing a study of thirty-eight
adults with disabilities receiving supported employments services, where follow-up indicated that only
67% held a competitive job eight to twelve years after enrollment).
12. BUTTERWORTH ET AL., supra note 4, at 25.
13. Stefan, supra note 9, at 922–23; Karlin, supra note 1.
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separate cases, plaintiffs are challenging sheltered workshop
placements, alleging discrimination under Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act).14 The DOJ Civil Rights Division is
involved in both cases.15
In light of the above mentioned difficulties, this article analyzes
the legal challenges against sheltered workshops under Title II of
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, particularly Lane v. Kitzhaber, to
determine whether placement in sheltered workshops constitutes
discrimination in violation of these statutes. A key consideration is
the application of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of ADA Title II
in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring.16 This article also evaluates
whether states’ decisions to eliminate funding for sheltered
workshops could result in Title II discrimination against individuals
not suited for supported employment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Sheltered Workshops
Sheltered workshops rose to prominence in the United States in the
decades following World War II.17 As of 2011 the number of adults
in sheltered workshops was an estimated 52,759.18 Individuals may
be “patients” under long-term arrangements or they may be short-

14. See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, United States v. Rhode Island,
1:13-cv-00442-L-PAS, at 1, 8 (D.R.I. filed June 13, 2013); Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199,
1199–1200 (D. Or. 2012); UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., Olmstead
Enforcement by Case or Matter, ADA.gov, http://www.ada.gov/olmstead/olmstead_cases_list2.htm#ri
(last visited Aug. 22, 2014).
15. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, United States v. Rhode Island, 1:13-cv-00442L-PAS at 1, 8 (D.R.I. filed June 13, 2013); United States of America’s Motion to Intervene, Lane v.
Kitzhaber, at 17 No. 3:12-cv-00138-ST (D. Or. Apr. 21, 2014), available at http://www.ada.gov/
olmstead/documents/lane _olmstead_mti.pdf.
16. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999) (holding that providing only
institutional residential services is discriminatory under ADA where community-based services are
determined appropriate for an individual and can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the
resources of the state and the needs of others with disabilities).
17. Migliore, supra note 5, at 1–2.
18. BUTTERWORTH ET AL., supra note 4, at 25.
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term trainees transitioning into community employment.19 Those
employed in sheltered workshops perform relatively simple tasks
such as assembling and packaging20 and may receive compensation
at rates below minimum wage.21
Proponents offer several arguments in favor of sheltered
workshops.22 First, sheltered workshops are safer than outside
employment, protecting adults with disabilities against crime and
harassment.23 Second, they are also less demanding because they are
able “to provide work commensurate with [disabled individuals’]
capabilities.”24 Proponents cite sheltered workshops’ social
environment and opportunities for fostering friendships as some of
sheltered workshops’ most important benefits.25 Other advantages
include the sense of structure and routine provided as well as the
consistency of providing assistance throughout the week and the
individual’s life span.26
19. Migliore, supra note 5, at 1.
20. Id.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c) (2012). Congress created the subminimum wage under § 14(c) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). Pub. L. No. 75-718, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as 29
U.S.C. § 214(c) (2012)). FLSA requires employers paying subminimum wage rates to obtain a
certificate from the United States Department of Labor (USDOL). 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(1) (2012). The
subminimum wage must be “commensurate with those paid to nonhandicapped workers . . . for
essentially the same type, quality, and quantity of work.” Id. § 214(c)(1)(B). Commensurate wages must
be adjusted at least annually “to reflect changes in the prevailing wage paid to experienced
nonhandicapped individuals in the locality for essentially the same type of work.” Id. § 214(c)(2)(B). In
2008, sheltered workshop employees earned an average $101 per month, based on an average seventyfour hours of work per month. Migliore, supra note 5, at 3.
22. See Hoffman, supra note 9, at 164–65; Migliore, supra note 5, at 2 (summarizing studies finding
that perceived risks in the outside world include crime and harassment, and seventy percent of parents
and caregivers reported “safety [is] a major concern,” and that one-fourth reported further that it “was
the most important concern influencing the[ir] choice of attending a sheltered workshop”).
23. See Hoffman, supra note 9, at 164; Migliore, supra note 5, at 2.
24. See Hoffman, supra note 9, at 164 (describing the ability of sheltered workshops to make
allowances for issues such as impaired concentration, lack of verbal and nonverbal communication
skills, low motivation, and problems understanding instructions); Migliore, supra note 5, at 2.
25. Hoffman, supra note 9, at 164; Migliore, supra note 5, at 2 (citing study finding that “of the over
90% [of] adults who expressed satisfaction with . . . sheltered workshops, 30% singled out friendships as
being the rationale for enjoying work.”).
26. Hoffman, supra note 9, at 164–65; Migliore, supra note 5, at 2–3 (citations omitted) (“Sheltered
workshops typically are open five days a week throughout the year, even in . . . recession[s]. When there
is no work, consumers engage in non-paid activities, take classes, or participate in leisure activities. In
addition, . . . once consumers are accepted in sheltered workshops they are unlikely to ever lose their
positions. Also, placing individuals in sheltered workshops is much easier than finding them jobs in the
open labor market because placement is more predictable.”).
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Opponents have advanced several arguments against sheltered
workshops.27 First, they argue that “[s]egregated work facilitates
feelings of isolation.”28 Second, opponents argue that sheltered
workshops reinforce a life of poverty and reliance on public
assistance.29 Third, that sheltered workshops are a “dead end” and
fail to lead to successful outcomes.30
B. Applicable Statutes and Case Law
1. Federal Statutes and Regulations Prohibiting Discrimination
ADA’s Title II broadly requires that no qualified individual with a
disability shall “by reason of such disability” be excluded from the
services of a public entity.31 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 has a provision, nearly identical to the ADA’s, prohibiting
discrimination on basis of disability with regard to “any
program . . . receiving federal financial assistance.”32 Although most
sheltered workshops are private entities,33 ostensibly exempt from
challenge under the ADA, most sheltered workshops are heavily
reliant on government funding.34 Thus, the state agencies that
administer employment services are susceptible to discrimination

27. See Hoffman, supra note 9, at 165–69; Migliore, supra note 5, at 3–4; NAT’L DISABILITY RTS.
NETWORK, Segregated and Exploited, supra note 8, at 11–34.
28. NAT’L DISABILITY RTS. NETWORK, Segregated and Exploited, supra note 8, at 8.
29. Id. at 8, 28 (noting that most workers with disabilities are “earning only 50% [of minimum
wage]” and “[t]his forces them to continue to rely on federal benefits such as SSI and Medicaid
which . . . require recipients to be poor.”).
30. Id. at 32–34. See also Migliore, supra note 5, at 3 (citations omitted) (“Several authors agree that
the transition rate from sheltered workshops to open labor market is very low and may range from under
one percent to about five percent.”).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012) (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”). The definition of
“public entity” includes state and local governments as well as “any department, agency . . . or other
instrumentality of a State . . . or local government . . . .” Id. § 12131(1)(A)–(B).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012).
33. See NAT’L DISABILITY RTS. NETWORK, Segregated & Exploited, supra note 8, at 55.
34. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-886, SPECIAL MINIMUM WAGE PROGRAMS:
CENTERS OFFER EMPLOYMENT AND SUPPORT SERVICES TO WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES, BUT LABOR
SHOULD IMPROVE OVERSIGHT 14–15 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01886.pdf.
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challenges under ADA Title II as well as Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.35
One funding source is Vocational Rehabilitation, a program
created by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.36 Medicaid also provides
funding through the Home & Community Based Services (HCBS)
waiver for “prevocational . . . and supported employment services”
that are not available to an individual through vocational
rehabilitation.37
The provisions in ADA Title II and the Rehabilitation Act each
have a corresponding regulation requiring the provision of services
“in the most integrated setting appropriate.”38 The appendix to the
ADA’s regulations defines this as “a setting that enables individuals
with disabilities to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest
extent possible” and further requires “persons with disabilities [to] be
provided the option of declining to accept a particular
accommodation.”39
Another ADA regulation requires a public entity to make
“reasonable modifications . . . necessary to avoid discrimination on
the basis of disability” unless it can demonstrate that “making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the
service . . . .”40 The Rehabilitation Act has similar regulations
requiring recipients to make “reasonable accommodation,” unless the
accommodation would impose an “undue hardship” on the program
or activity.41
35. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1200 (D. Or. 2012).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2012). See also Alberto Migliore, Vocational Rehabilitation, INT’L.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REHABILITATION, http://cirrie.buffalo.edu/encyclopedia/en/article/128/ (last visited
Aug. 22, 2014) (“Typical services include, but are not limited to, vocational assessment and evaluation,
vocational training, general skills upgrading, refresher courses, career counseling, on-the-job training
program, job search, and consultation with employers for job accommodation and modification.”).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n (2012).
38. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2012) (providing that “[a] public entity shall administer services,
programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals
with disabilities”); Id. § 41.51(d) (regulation enacted pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
likewise providing that “[r]ecipients shall administer programs and activities in the most integrated
setting appropriate to the needs of qualified handicapped persons”).
39. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App. B (2011).
40. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2012).
41. Id. §§ 41.53, 42.511; 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (2012).
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B. Olmstead And Other Applicable Case Law
In 1999, the Supreme Court addressed Title II of ADA in
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring in the context of a state’s provision
of residential services.42 The plaintiffs in Olmstead were adults with
disabilities challenging their confinement in mental hospitals.43 In an
opinion by Justice Ginsberg, the Court recognized that such
“unjustified institutional isolation” qualifies as discrimination under
ADA,44 and states are thus required to provide community-based
treatment where: (1) such placement is appropriate for the
individual,45 (2) the individual does not oppose such treatment,46 and
(3) placement can reasonably be accommodated, taking into account
the resources available to the state and the needs of others with
mental disabilities.47 A caveat in Justice Ginsberg’s opinion
emphasized that “nothing in the ADA or its implementing regulations
condones termination of institutional settings for persons unable to
handle or benefit from community settings.”48
42. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999) (“Specifically, we confront the
question whether the proscription of discrimination may require placement of persons with mental
disabilities in community settings rather than in institutions. The answer, we hold, is a qualified yes.”).
43. Id. at 593–94.
44. Id. at 600. Justice Ginsberg’s opinion outlined two bases for this judgment: (1) that “institutional
placement . . . perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy
of participating in community life” and (2) that “confinement in an institution severely diminishes the
everyday life activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work options,
economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.” Id. at 600–01.
45. Id. at 587. Justice Ginsberg explained Title II of ADA only prohibits discrimination against
“qualified individual[s],” defined by ADA as those persons with disabilities who “with or without
reasonable modifications . . . meet the essential eligibility requirements . . . .” Id. at 602 (citing 42
U.S.C. §§ 12131(2), 12132). The court held that “[c]onsistent with these provisions, [states] generally
may rely on the reasonable assessments of its own professionals in determining whether an individual
‘meets the essential eligibility requirements’ for habilitation in a community-based program. Absent
such qualification, it would be inappropriate to remove a patient from the more restrictive setting.” Id.
(citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1998)) (regulation enacted pursuant to ADA requiring public entities to
administer services in “the most integrated setting appropriate”).
46. Id. at 587. “Nothing in this part shall be construed to require an individual . . . to accept an
accommodation . . . which such individual chooses not to accept.” Id. at 602. (citing 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.130(e)(1) (1998)).
47. Id. at 587. This determination applies to the analysis of a state raising a defense pursuant to 28
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) that a modification “would fundamentally alter the nature of the service.” See Id.
at 597.
48. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 601–02. Justice Ginsberg recognized “[s]tates’ need to maintain a range of
facilities for . . . persons with diverse mental disabilities.” Id. at 597. Justice Ginsberg noted that for
some individuals, “no placement outside the institution may ever be appropriate” and that others may
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Courts have applied Olmstead to Title II discrimination challenges
beyond mental institutions, expanding the scope to include
intermediate care facilities and other residential settings.49 In the
Olmstead cases, the fundamental inquiry is whether the services are
provided in the most integrated setting appropriate.50 A relevant
consideration in this determination is “[w]hether [the] particular
setting is an institution.”51
C. Lane v. Kitzhaber
In Lane v. Kitzhaber, eight individuals with disabilities filed a
class action suit against Oregon, alleging they and thousands of
others are “unnecessarily segregated in sheltered workshops.” 52
Plaintiffs’ original complaint argued that Oregon violates ADA’s
Title II and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act through its
unnecessary segregation of persons in sheltered workshops and
failure to provide “an adequate array of integrated . . . and supported
employment services.”53
In May 2012, the district court in Lane v. Kitzhaber ruled that the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act mandates applied to these services and
that the risk of institutionalization addressed in Olmstead applies to

occasionally require institutionalized care “to stabilize acute psychiatric symptoms.” Id. at 605.
49. Benjamin v. Dept. of Pub. Welfare of Pa., 768 F. Supp. 2d 747, 752 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (challenge
to intermediate care facilities); Kevin M. Cremin, Challenges to Institutionalization: The Definition of
“Institution” and the Future of Olmstead Litigation, 17 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 143, 148–50 (2012).
50. Cremin, supra note 49, at 145. Guiding this analysis is the appendix to 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d)
which defines a “most integrated setting” as one that “enables individuals with disabilities to interact
with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible.” 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. B (2013) (effective
March 15, 2011). See also Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 598 F. Supp. 2d 289, 320 (E.D.N.Y.
2009), vacated, 675 F.3d 149 (rejecting plaintiff’s contention that “the key is whether persons . . . have
opportunities for contact with nondisabled persons, rather than the number of actual contacts”). This
inquiry is “fact-specific and subject to the ‘fundamental alteration’ defense.” Id. at 321.
51. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 223–24 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). The court
adopted the definition of “institution” as “a segregated setting for a large number of people that through
its restrictive practices and its controls on individualization and independence limits a person’s ability to
interact with other people who do not have a similar disability.” Id. at 199. The court explained that “a
plaintiff need not prove that the setting . . . is an ‘institution’ to establish a violation of the integration
mandate.” Id. at 223.
52. Class Action Allegation Complaint at 2, Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (D. Or. 2012)
(No. 3:12-cv-00138-ST), 2012 WL 246537.
53. Id. at 47–48.
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segregation in an employment setting.54 The court, however, granted
a motion to dismiss with leave to amend because of a defect in
plaintiffs’ demand for relief.55 Plaintiffs subsequently filed an
amended complaint56 and in August 2012 the judge certified as a
class “‘all individuals in Oregon with intellectual or developmental
disabilities who are in, or who have been referred to, sheltered
workshops’ and ‘who are qualified for supported employment.’”57
Several important developments followed. In March 2013, the
DOJ Civil Rights Division filed a motion to intervene on plaintiffs’
behalf.58 In April 2013, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber responded
with an executive order that eliminated funding for any new
placements in sheltered workshops and committed to increased
funding for supported employment services.59 The district court
allowed the DOJ to intervene in May 2013.60
In April 2014, another group of individuals with disabilities
entered the fray with their own motion to intervene.61 These
individuals—each a member of the certified plaintiff class—moved
to decertify the class, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims could impair
their ability to choose sheltered workshops over community-based
employment.62 The district court denied intervention and issued an
opinion that highlights the main issues.63 The opinion explains that
plaintiffs’ demand is not to close sheltered workshops, but rather to
54. Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1205–06 (D. Or. 2012).
55. Id. at 1208. Plaintiffs’ allegation that defendants failed to offer “an adequate array
of . . . services” was subject to dismissal because it demanded a certain level of benefits. Id. (emphasis
omitted). The opinion provided that “these allegations . . . must be amended to clarify that defendants
are violating ADA Title II and the Rehabilitation Act by denying employment services to plaintiffs for
which they are eligible with the result of unnecessarily segregating them in sheltered workshops.” Id.
(emphasis added).
56. First Amended Complaint at 48–50, Lane v. Kitzhaber, 283 F.R.D. 587 (D. Or. 2012) (No. 3:12cv-00138-ST), 2012 WL 2282365.
57. Lane v. Kitzhaber, 283 F.R.D. 587, 602 (D. Or. 2012).
58. United States of America’s Motion to Intervene, Lane v. Kitzhaber, No. 3:12-cv-00138-ST (D.
Or. Mar. 27, 2013), available at http://www.ada.gov/olmstead/documents/lane_olmstead_mti.pdf.
59. Or.
Exec.
Order
No.
13-04
(Apr.
10,
2013),
available
at
http://www.oregon.gov/gov/docs/executive_orders/eo_13-04.pdf.
60. Lane v. Kitzhaber, No. 3:12-cv-00138-ST, 2014 WL 2807701, at *1 (D. Or. June 20, 2014).
61. Motion to Intervene and Supporting Memorandum, Lane v. Kitzhaber, No. 3:12-cv-00138-ST
(D. Or. Apr. 21, 2014), ECF No. 200.
62. Id. at 2–4.
63. Lane, 2014 WL 2807701, at *1.
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increase access to supported employment.64 On its face, this appears
to assuage concerns that the ability to choose placement in sheltered
workshops is at risk. But the opinion makes it clear that Governor
Kitzhaber’s executive order poses a very real threat to the ability to
choose placement in sheltered workshops, and proponents can do
little to prevent the state from eliminating this choice.65
II. ANALYSIS: ARE SHELTERED WORKSHOPS DISCRIMINATORY
UNDER FEDERAL LAW?
Although ADA Title II Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act both
provide avenues for a discrimination challenge against sheltered
workshops,66 analysis under ADA Title II alone is sufficient because
the acts are similar in substance.67 In applying Title II, courts have
recognized a prima facie case for discrimination.68 First, a plaintiff
must be a qualified individual with a disability.69 Second, a plaintiff
must be excluded from participation in or denied the benefit from a
public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or otherwise
discriminated against by a public entity.70

64. Id. at *5 (“[B]ased upon the express representations of plaintiffs’ counsel, this court found that
‘plaintiffs do not seek to close all sheltered workshops or force people to leave the workshop if that is
not their preference.’”). The district court also added that the proposed intervenors “may be able to
intervene in the remedial phase.” Id. at *6.
65. Id. at *3 (“The Executive Order may well limit access to sheltered workshops. However, neither
the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act creates a right to remain in the program or facility of one’s
choosing.”).
66. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).
67. See Folkerts v. City of Waverly, 707 F.3d 975, 983 (8th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) (“The
ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are ‘similar in substance’ and, with the exception of the
Rehabilitation Act’s federal funding requirement, ‘cases interpreting either are applicable and
interchangeable’ for analytical purposes.”). Because most sheltered workshops are at least partially
funded by federal dollars, the Rehabilitation Act’s federal funding requirement is satisfied. See 29
U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012).
68. See, e.g., E.R.K. ex rel. R.K. v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 728 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2013);
Folkerts, 707 F.3d at 983; Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 73–74 (2nd Cir. 2009); Tucker v. Tennessee,
539 F.3d 526, 532 (6th Cir. 2008).
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012); see also, e.g., E.R.K. ex rel. R.K., 728 F.3d at 992; Folkerts, 707
F.3d at 983; Harris, 572 F. 3d at 73–74; Tucker, 539 F.3d at 532.
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012); E.R.K. ex rel. R.K., 728 F.3d at 992; Folkerts, 707 F.3d at 983;
Harris, 572 F.3d at 73–74; Tucker, 539 F.3d at 532.
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If the prima facie case is made, there is an important qualification
which the state can raise as a defense: pursuant to the “fundamentalalteration” provisions, participation or placement must be something
that can be reasonably accommodated by the state’s taking into
account the resources available to the state and the needs of others
with disabilities.71
A. The First Element: Analysis at the Individual Level
The text of ADA Title II describes discrimination as it relates to
the individual.72 It appears from the outset that a wholesale challenge
to all sheltered workshops is quite difficult because, under Title II, an
institution is not analyzed in the abstract without consideration of the
attributes of those served.73 The very first element of the prima facie
case requires a “qualified individual.”74
A “qualified individual” is one who “with or without reasonable
modifications . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements” for the
program or service in question.75 In light of this element, it follows
that an individual in a sheltered workshop can be a victim of
discrimination only if he is qualified for a more integrated option.76
Professionals in the disability field use a broad range of factors to
evaluate an individual’s eligibility for employment services.77 The
71. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999) (“In evaluating [the]
fundamental-alteration defense, [a] District Court must consider, in view of the resources available to
the State, not only the cost of providing community-based care . . . but also the range of services the
State provides others with mental disabilities, and the State’s obligation to mete out those services
equitably.”).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012) (proscribing discrimination against a “qualified individual”
(emphasis added)).
73. See id.
74. See id.; see also E.R.K. ex rel. R.K., 728 F.3d at 992; Folkerts, 707 F.3d at 983; Harris, 572 F.3d
at 73–74; Tucker, 539 F.3d at 532. Considerable authority supports the proposition that a “[s]tate
generally may rely on the reasonable assessments of its own professionals” to determine whether an
individual is qualified. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 602; see also Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d, 1199,
1203 (D. Or. 2012).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2012).
76. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 596–97.
77. See, e.g., Client Services Policy Manual, GA. VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION AGENCY 1, 10031–100-32 (May 1, 2013), http://gvra.georgia.gov/sites/gvra.georgia.gov/files/related_files/site_page/
2013%20Client%20Services%20Policy%20Manual.pdf (listing modes of assessment for Vocational
Rehabilitation service plan); Part II: Policies and Procedures for Comprehensive Supports Waiver
Program, GA. DEPT. OF CMTY. HEALTH DIV. OF MEDICAID 1, VII-3 (July 1, 2014),
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factors considered may include specific medical diagnoses,
behavioral history, physical health examinations, and a variety of
skills and abilities relevant to the individual’s success in the
workplace.78
Because analysis of discrimination occurs on an individual basis, it
is also necessary to consider the individual’s own preferences
regarding services.79 Preference for an alternative service or
accommodation is an implicit requirement for the prima facie case.80
The ADA’s regulations clearly provide that an individual may
decline a particular accommodation.81 The Supreme Court’s decision
in Olmstead similarly held that there is no federal requirement to
impose community-based treatment on those who do not desire it.82
Consequently, individuals who prefer sheltered workshop
employment are outside the scope of a Title II discrimination claim—
an important distinction recognized by both the plaintiffs and the
court in Lane v. Kitzhaber.83
The individualized nature of Title II poses serious limitations on
the extent to which a discrimination claim can challenge sheltered
workshops. By combining the qualification element with the
preference factor, one can classify sheltered workshop employees

http://asiworks.com/sdp/docsPDFsGeorgia/Policies/COMP_Part_II.pdf (requiring use of various
screening tools in formulation of Medicaid recipients’ individual service plans).
78. See, e.g., Client Services Policy Manual, supra note 77 (listing criteria for evaluation, including
stamina, ability to remain on task, interpersonal skills, ability to follow directions, functional skills, and
ability to perform specific tasks).
79. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 602 (noting that there is no “federal requirement that communitybased treatment be imposed on patients who do not desire it.”); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(e)(1) (2011)
(specifying that “[n]othing in this part shall be construed to require an individual with a disability to
accept an accommodation . . . which such individual chooses not to accept.”).
80. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(e)(1) (2011). Beyond the requirements’ inclusion in ADA’s regulations, it
does not require any great feat of logic to assume that an individual who resorts to filing a lawsuit in
federal court seeking the remedy of an alternative service obviously prefers to receive that service. Id.
81. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B (2011) (“[28 C.F.R. § 35.130(e)] provide[s] that . . . persons with
disabilities must be provided the option of declining to accept a particular accommodation.”).
82. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 602 (“Nor is there any federal requirement that community-based
treatment be imposed on patients who do not desire it.” (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1998))).
83. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1204 (D. Or. 2012) (“Plaintiffs do not argue that
sheltered workshops must be eliminated because they are per se illegal, but instead argue that, in most
instances, a more integrated setting is appropriate . . . . Accordingly, participation for persons with
disabilities in sheltered workshops ‘must be a choice, not a requirement.’”).
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into four categories.84 The first category encompasses those who both
qualify for and desire to receive a more integrated option like
supported employment.85 These individuals may have a
discrimination claim if they can satisfy the remaining Title II
elements.86 In the second category are those who are qualified but do
not desire to receive supported employment.87 The third category
includes those who are not qualified but nonetheless desire to receive
supported employment.88 The fourth category includes those who are
not qualified for supported employment and do not desire to receive
those services.89 Because they fail to satisfy one or both of the
qualification and preference requirements, individuals in the second,
third, and fourth categories are beyond the scope of a discrimination
claim.
It is apparent that a challenge to sheltered workshops is necessarily
narrow in scope because potential victims of discrimination lie in
only one of the four categories outlined. An action challenging all
sheltered workshop placements as discrimination under ADA Title II
must necessarily fail because those individuals in the second, third,
and fourth categories are beyond the scope of such a claim. This
conclusion follows directly from Olmstead, where the Court
illustrated that institutionalization is not necessarily discrimination:
“[w]e emphasize that nothing in the ADA or its implementing
84. It is important to note that quantifying the relative sizes of these categories is beyond the scope
of this article. It is possible that a majority of individuals with disabilities fall into the first group.
85. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at 33, Lane v. Kitzhaber, 283 F.R.D. 587 (D. Or. 2012) (No.
3:12-cv-00138-ST), 2012 WL 2282365 at *33 (“The class consists of several thousand individuals with
intellectual and developmental disabilities who are qualified for supported employment services. Over
2,300 individuals are segregated in sheltered workshops in Oregon at any given time, most of whom
could and would prefer to work in an integrated employment setting.” (emphasis added)). This group
includes the individuals who attempted to intervene in Lane. Lane v. Kitzhaber, No. 3:12-cv-00138-ST,
2014 WL 2807701, at *1 (D. Or. June 20, 2014).
86. See Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1204–06 (finding no statutory or regulatory basis to conclude that
ADA’s integration mandate cannot apply to the risk of institutionalization in a non-residential setting
like a sheltered workshop).
87. See, e.g., Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 602 (“Nor is there any federal requirement that communitybased treatment be imposed on patients who do not desire it.” (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1998))).
88. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 602 (“Consistent with these provisions, the State generally may rely
on the reasonable assessments of its own professionals in determining whether an individual ‘meets the
essential eligibility requirements’ . . . . Absent such qualification, it would be inappropriate to remove a
patient from the more restrictive setting.” (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1998))).
89. See supra notes 87–88.
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regulations condones termination of institutional settings for persons
unable to handle or benefit from community settings.”90
B. Establishing Discrimination in The Context Of A Sheltered
Workshop
The second element of the prima facie case is the actual
discrimination itself.91 It requires that a plaintiff be “excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.”92 To find the actual discrimination required by this
element, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that there was an exclusion or
denial of participation or benefit from a public entity’s services, and
(2) that this denial was discriminatory in effect.93
1. Exclusion or Denial of Services
The ADA does not impose any naked obligation on a state to
provide specific services or benefits.94 In Lane v. Kitzhaber, the
plaintiffs’ original complaint was dismissed for crossing the line into
demanding a certain level of benefits.95 A Title II challenge against a
sheltered workshop “survives only if it truly alleges a ‘discriminatory
denial of services’ and must be dismissed if it instead concerns the
‘adequacy’ of services provided.”96 This necessarily implies that a
state must provide some alternative to sheltered workshops before it
90. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 601–02. The majority opinion further explained that ADA’s mission is not
“to drive States to move institutionalized patients into an inappropriate setting.” Id. at 605.
91. See supra Part II.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012). See also R.K. ex rel. R.K. v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 728 F.3d 982, 992
(9th Cir. 2013); Folkerts v. City of Waverly, 707 F.3d 975, 983 (8th Cir. 2013); Harris v. Mills, 572
F.3d 66, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2009); Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 532 (6th Cir. 2008).
93. Harris, 572 F.3d at 603 n. 14.
94. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603 n.14 (“We do not . . . hold that the ADA imposes on the States a
‘standard of care’ . . . or . . . requires States to ‘provide a certain level of benefits to individuals with
disabilities.’” (quoting Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 623–2 (Thomas, J. dissenting))).
95. Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1208 (“[S]ome of [sic] allegations . . . seek the forbidden remedy of
requiring defendants to provide an adequate level of employment services to enable plaintiffs to obtain a
competitive job. In particular, plaintiffs allege that defendants are violating Title II of the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act by failing ‘to offer an adequate array of . . . services’ and ‘to provide . . . supporting
employment services that would enable them to work in integrated employment settings.’”original).
96. Id. at 1207.
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can be subject to a discrimination claim, and a state that provides no
alternative is apparently immune from challenge because there is no
denial of service.97
The alternative, proposed by the plaintiffs in Lane v. Kitzhaber and
various sheltered workshop opponents, is supported employment.98
Once a state offers supported employment, it may open itself to
claims from individuals denied access.99 However, a denial of
available benefits or services is not by itself sufficient to create a
Title II claim.100 The denial must have a discriminatory effect.101
2. Discriminatory Effect: Application of the Integration Mandate
Discrimination in a sheltered workshop may be established
through a violation of ADA’s integration mandate.102 Plaintiffs’
claims in Lane v. Kitzhaber rely on the holding in Olmstead that
discrimination includes “unjustified institutional isolation.” 103 The
district court agreed that “the risk of institutionalization addressed in
both Olmstead and Dreyfus includes segregation in the employment
setting,” but did not address whether Oregon’s sheltered workshop
program violates the integration mandate.104
Olmstead and Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Patterson discuss the
abstract perils of institutionalization at length, but give very little
guidance.105 The definition of “institution” adopted in Disability
97. But see BUTTERWORTH ET. AL., supra note 4, at 25.
98. Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. See also, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 9, at 179; Stefan, supra note
9, at 880; NAT’L DISABILITY RTS. NETWORK, Segregated & Exploited, supra note 8, at 46, 48.
99. See, e.g., Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012). A person must be a “qualified individual” to be denied the services of
a public entity under Title II. Id.
101. Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1207 (requiring Title II complaint to allege a “‘discriminatory denial of
services’” (emphasis added) (citing Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 174–75 (1st Cir. 2006))).
102. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2011). See also Cremin, supra note 49, at 145 (“[T]he fundamental
question in these so-called Olmstead cases is not whether the person is receiving services in an
institution, but whether the person with a disability is receiving services in the most integrated setting
that is appropriate to his or her needs.”).
103. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600; Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1207.
104. Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1205. The court did not touch on the merits of the discrimination claim
because the case was dismissed with leave to amend due to defects in plaintiffs’ demand for relief. See
id. at 1208.
105. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600; Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Patterson, 598 F. Supp. 2d 289, 321
(E.D.N.Y. 2009); Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Patterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 223–24 (E.D.N.Y.
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Advocates, Inc. is little more than a restatement of ADA’s integration
mandate.106 The issue of “institutionalization” proves more or less
irrelevant in Disability Advocates, Inc. because the district court
holds that “the federal regulations mean what they say” and used a
straight textual application of the integration mandate.107 The lack of
guidance for analyzing “institutions” suggests that whether a
sheltered workshop is “institutional” is likely irrelevant.108
In practice, analysis of the integration mandate in Olmstead and its
progeny is a simple test: if there is some alternative that provides a
more integrated setting than the original service then the original
service’s setting cannot logically be the most integrated.109 Following
this reasoning, sheltered workshops cannot be the most integrated
setting because supported employment provided in the community is
more integrated than sheltered work in a facility. Of course, this does
not mean that all sheltered workshop placements are discriminatory
because of the need for a qualified individual. In effect, a denial of
services is discriminatory so long as the individual is qualified for the
service and the service is more integrated.
C. Reasonable Modifications vs. Fundamental Alterations: The
State’s Defense
If a plaintiff can establish that his placement in a sheltered
workshop is discriminatory, the claim must still clear the state’s
fundamental alteration defense.110 A plaintiff cannot simply argue
2009).
106. Disability Advocates, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 199 (adopting definition of “institution” as “a
segregated setting for a large number of people that through its restrictive practices and its controls on
individualization and independence limits a person’s ability to interact with other people who do not
have a similar disability.” (emphasis added)).
107. Disability Advocates, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
108. Disability Advocates, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 223 (“Under the [integration mandate], a plaintiff
need not prove that the setting at issue is an ‘institution’ to establish a violation of the integration
mandate.”); Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that
“nothing in the plain language of [ADA] regulations . . . limits protection to [institutionalized persons]”
and “while it is true that the plaintiffs in Olmstead were institutionalized . . . , nothing
in . . . Olmstead . . . supports a conclusion that institutionalization is a prerequisite to enforcement of the
ADA’s integration requirements.”).
109. See, e.g., Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 602; Disability Advocates, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 320–21.
110. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597 (“In evaluating [the] fundamental-alteration defense, [a court]
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that supported employment is not a fundamental alteration if the state
already provides that service.111 Under this defense, a state may argue
that immediate relief is inequitable because the state has limited
resources with which to care and treat for a large and diverse
population of people with disabilities.112
A state’s motive to resist a demand for supported employment is
likely budgetary in nature, and is not based on some animus towards
adults with disabilities.113 A state may not want to avoid supported
employment entirely; it might just need time to develop those
services and allocate necessary funding. In this case, a state’s
fundamental alteration defense is not an outright defense, and may be
more accurately described as the state positing its own reasonable
modifications.114
Because evaluating the fundamental alteration defense is a
“complex, fact intensive inquiry,”115 it is difficult to project the
success of such a defense in a sheltered workshop case. The court in
Lane v. Kitzhaber has not yet addressed whether Oregon has a valid
fundamental alteration defense.116 The only conclusion that can be
drawn at this point is that such a defense will not be taken lightly

must consider, in view of the resources available to the State, not only the cost of providing communitybased care . . . , but also the range of services the State provides others . . . and [its] obligation to mete
out those services equitably.”).
111. Id. at 603 (noting “[t]he State’s responsibility, once it provides community-based treatment to
qualified persons with disabilities, is not boundless,” and rejecting that construction because it “would
leave the State virtually defenseless once it is shown that the plaintiff is qualified for the service or
program she seeks.”).
112. See id. at 604.
113. Id. at 611 (“At the outset it should be noted there is no allegation that Georgia officials acted on
the basis of animus or unfair stereotypes regarding the disabled. Underlying much discrimination law is
the notion that animus can lead to false and unjustified stereotypes, and vice versa. Of course, the line
between animus and stereotype is often indistinct, and it is not always necessary to distinguish between
them.”).
114. See id. at 605–06 (“If, for example, the State were to demonstrate that it had a comprehensive,
effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings,
and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State’s endeavors to keep its
institutions fully populated, the reasonable-modifications standard would be met.”).
115. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Patterson, 598 F. Supp. 2d 289, 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting
Martin v. Taft, 222 F. Supp. 2d 940, 986 (S.D. Ohio 2002)).
116. See generally Lane v. Kitzhaber, No. 3:12-cv-00138, 2014 WL 2807701 (D. Or. June 20, 2014);
Lane v. Kitzhaber, No. 3:12-cv-00138, 2013 WL 6798470 (D. Or. Dec. 19, 2013); Lane v. Kitzhaber,
283 F.R.D. 587 (D. Or. 2012); Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (D. Or. 2012).
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because Olmstead suggests that considerable deference is due to state
policymakers117 and the characteristics of services of the state.118
D. How Far Can a Sheltered Workshop Challenge Go?
It appears that, because a Title II discrimination claim necessarily
depends on whether the individual is qualified for a more integrated
service, such a claim cannot legally compel an outright end to
sheltered workshops. Discrimination can only occur where an
individual is qualified for some alternative, such as supported
employment, and prefers to receive that service.119 In Olmstead, the
Supreme Court unequivocally stated that some individuals may not
be qualified for more integrated settings and the ADA does not
condone termination of more restricted settings for those
individuals.120 Title II challenges such as Lane v. Kitzhaber are
limited to improving access to integrated options like supported
employment without the overreaching effect of eliminating sheltered
workshops.121
E. Eliminating Sheltered Workshops: Discrimination?
Despite the limits on Title II claims, sheltered workshops are not
entirely safe. The greatest threat to sheltered workshops is political.
Vermont has completely eliminated sheltered workshops.122 Oregon
117. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605 (holding that it is necessary that the state have some leeway in
order to “maintain a range of facilities and to administer services with an even hand.”); id. at 610 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It is of central importance . . . that courts apply today’s decision . . . with
appropriate deference to the program funding decisions of state policymakers.”).
118. See id. at 597, 607 (holding that, in evaluating a fundamental alteration defense, a court must
consider the resources available to the state, cost of providing supported employment, the state’s range
of services provided to others with disabilities, and the obligation to “mete out those services
equitably”).
119. See supra Part II.A.
120. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597.
121. See generally Lane, 283 F.R.D. at 602 (finding plaintiffs’ demand for injunctive relief “is aimed
at providing classwide alternatives to segregated employment.”); Lane v. Kitzhaber, No. 3:12-cv-00138ST, 2014 WL 2807701, at *6 (D. Or. June 20, 2014) (discussing Governor Kitzhaber’s executive order
eliminating funding for new sheltered workshop placements, noting that the order “does not reflect the
relief requested . . . and does not and cannot constitute enforceable relief requested of, or eventually
ordered by, this court.”)
122. See NAT’L DISABILITY RTS. NETWORK, Beyond Segregated and Exploited, supra note 8, at 34.
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Governor John Kitzhaber’s executive order eliminates funding for
new sheltered workshop placements.123 New York has also
implemented its own measures to phase out sheltered workshops.124
Individuals who cannot benefit from supported employment may
have no recourse under ADA Title II. Those individuals in states like
Vermont cannot use a Title II discrimination suit to challenge the
state’s refusal to provide sheltered workshops because of the
restrictions on demanding a level of benefits.125 Because some
individuals in New York and Oregon are still receiving sheltered
workshop services, citizens denied by those states could conceivably
make a prima facie case for Title II discrimination: (1) they are
qualified and desire to receive sheltered workshop services, and (2)
they are excluded from services for which they are eligible.126
Such a claim is unlikely to succeed. The court in Lane v. Kitzhaber
stated that the individuals who attempted to intervene in the case
“lack a significant legally protectable interest under the ADA or other
federal law in continuing to receive sheltered workshop services,”
and pointed out that “numerous federal courts have rejected the
‘obverse Olmstead’ argument that a premature discharge into the
community violates the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.”127 Even if a
court allowed such a claim to proceed, a state could offer a
fundamental alteration defense: allowing new admissions would
fundamentally alter the state’s plan to transition its employment
services to community-based settings. It seems unlikely that a court
123. See Or. Exec. Order No. 13–04 (Apr. 10, 2013), available at http://www.oregon.gov/gov/docs/
executive_orders/eo_13-04.pdf.
124. See Karlin, supra note 1.
125. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1207 (D. Or. 2012) (“Olmstead admonishes that a
disability discrimination claim may not be premised upon allegations that defendants failed to meet a
particular standard of care with regard to the services provided or upon a request for a particular level of
benefits . . . . Thus, a claim survives only if it truly alleges a ‘discriminatory denial of services’ and must
be dismissed if it instead concerns the ‘adequacy’ of the services provided.”); Migliore, supra note 5, at
2.
126. See supra Part II.
127. Lane v. Kitzhaber, No. 3:12-cv-00138-ST, 2014 WL 2807701, at *3 (D. Or. June 20, 2014). The
court reasoned that “[t]here is no ADA provision that providing community placement is a
discrimination. It may be a bad medical decision, or poor policy, but it is not discrimination based on
disability.” Id. (citing Richard S. v. Dep’t of Developmental Servs. of Cal., No. SA CV 97–219–
GLT(ANx), 2000 WL 35944246, at *3 (CD Cal Mar. 27, 2000)) (emphasis in original).
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would grant plaintiffs relief if sheltered workshop services will soon
be eliminated.
III. PROPOSAL
To provide the best possible employment services for each and
every individual with a disability, states should accommodate access
to community-based services like supported employment while
maintaining sheltered workshops for those individuals who prefer
that option.128 States should be able to reach this outcome through
their own administration of services, obviating the need for judicial
intervention.129 Where states fail to provide sufficient access to
employment services, courts should carefully apply Olmstead to Title
II claims and fashion a remedy focused on providing access to the
denied services.130 State governments should try to avoid litigation on
this issue by creating Olmstead transition plans for employment
services.131 Both state governments and courts should be mindful that
eliminating sheltered workshops is neither necessary nor desirable.132
A. Courts Should Apply Olmstead to Title II Claims Challenging
State-Funded Employment Services
Courts should follow the lead of Lane v. Kitzhaber and apply
Olmstead to Title II claims against sheltered workshop placements.133
More specifically, courts should assess the individual’s qualifications
and preferences to determine whether placement in community-based
services is appropriate.134 Questions of sheltered workshops’
purported institutional nature are irrelevant to this analysis.135
128. See infra Part III.C.
129. See infra Part III.B.
130. Olmstead v. L.C ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
131. See generally id.
132. See supra Part I.A and notes 22–26. See also Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1204 (D.
Or. 2012).
133. Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1206 (“In sum, this court discerns no statutory or regulatory basis for
concluding that the integration mandate to provide services in the most integrated setting appropriate
applies only where the plaintiff faces a risk of institutionalization in a residential setting.”).
134. See supra Part II.A–B.
135. See supra Part II.B.2.
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By the same token, the remedy for discrimination must focus on
accommodating access to community-based employment services for
qualified individuals.136 Again, the remedy should not affect
sheltered workshops because Title II’s goal is to eliminate
discrimination.137 Because the form of discrimination is a denial of
services, the solution is to eliminate the denial of services by
accommodating access to the state’s community-based services like
supported employment.138 This result follows directly from
Olmstead, where the remedy was not a forced closure of mental
institutions, but rather increased access to community-based living
arrangements.139
Courts should also heed Olmstead’s guidelines for analyzing a
state’s fundamental alteration defense.140 Changes to a state’s
services cannot happen overnight because a state may need several
years to plan and allocate resources to building its capacity to provide
community-based services.141 Olmstead provides for states to have a

136. See, e.g., Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 601–02 (“We emphasize that nothing in the ADA or its
implementing regulations condones termination of institutional settings for persons unable to handle or
benefit from community settings.”).
137. See id. at 602; Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1200. See also supra Part II.D.
138. See, e.g., Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1207–08 (“[Plaintiffs] seek a court order mandating: (1) a
treatment planning process that properly and fairly assesses the individuals’ ability and interest in
supported employment; (2) provision of supported employment services to those individuals who
qualify for and are interested in them; and (3) a supported employment program that complies with
CMS and other national accrediting standards.” (footnote omitted)).
139. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604 (“ADA is not reasonably read to impel States to phase out
institutions”). The court went so far as to hold that it would be inappropriate to remove an individual
from a more restrictive setting unless the state’s professionals determine that the individual meets the
essential eligibility requirements for a community-based program. Id. at 602.
140. Id. at 603. See also Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Patterson, 598 F. Supp. 2d 289, 335 (E.D.N.Y.
2009) (“Relying on Olmstead’s language . . . lower courts evaluating the fundamental alteration defense
have focused on the costs of the requested relief in light of a state’s obligations to other individuals with
mental disabilities.”).
141. See generally Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603 (“The State’s responsibility, once it provides
community-based treatment to qualified persons with disabilities, is not boundless.”). Justice Ginsberg
further explains in the majority opinion:
Sensibly construed, the fundamental-alteration component of the reasonablemodifications regulation would allow the State to show that, in the allocation of available
resources, immediate relief for the plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the
responsibility the State has undertaken for the care and treatment of a large and diverse
population of persons with mental disabilities.
Id. at 604.
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working plan and waiting lists that move at a reasonable pace.142
Individuals should not be able to use a Title II claim to jump ahead of
others on the waiting list.143
B. States Should Create Olmstead Plans for Employment Services
The most important action that states should take is to implement a
transition plan—also referred to as an “Olmstead plan”—to offer
qualified individuals an opportunity to go from sheltered workshops
to community-based services like supported employment.144
Olmstead provides that states can fulfill their obligations by
demonstrating a comprehensive working plan and a waiting list that
moves at a reasonable pace.145 An Olmstead plan helps prevent future
litigation because adults with disabilities have no reason to sue if
they have access to the services they need. If a Title II claim is filed,
perhaps by someone who feels the waiting list is not moving fast
enough, the Olmstead plan helps establish the fundamental alteration
defense by showing that the state is already making reasonable
accommodations as required under ADA regulations.146
142. Id. at 605–06.
143. See id. at 606 (“[A] court would have no warrant effectively to order displacement of persons at
the top of the community-based treatment waiting list by individuals lower down who commenced civil
actions.”).
144. See id. at 605–06. See also Disability Advocates, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 339. The plan does not
necessarily need to be evidenced in a single document. See id.
145. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605–06. There is a circuit split as to whether an Olmstead plan is a
necessary component of a fundamental alteration defense. Disability Advocates, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d at
336–37 (comparing cases evaluation the necessity of an Olmstead plan). Compare Pa. Prot. and
Advocacy, Inc. v. Pa. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 402 F.3d 374, 381 (3rd Cir. 2005) (“[T]he only sensible
reading of the integration mandate consistent with the Court’s Olmstead opinion allows for a
fundamental alteration defense only if the accused agency has developed and implemented a plan to
come into compliance with the ADA and RA.”), with Martin v. Taft, 222 F. Supp. 2d 940, 985–86 (S.D.
Ohio 2002) (“[D]efendants appear to concede that the State has no plan or waiting lists that move at a
reasonable pace. Although this is not a good thing for defendants, it does not necessarily mean [they]
cannot prevail.” (footnote omitted)). The court in Disability Advocates Inc. ultimately held that a plan is
not necessary but that “a state must make efforts to comply with the integration mandate in order to
show that specific relief requested would be too costly.” Disability Advocates, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d at
339.
146. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607; Disability Advocates, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d at 337. But see
Martin, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 985 (“[T]he fundamental alteration analysis entails far more than the
comprehensive plan and reasonably paced waiting list example . . . . [T]he example is not actually an
illustration of fundamental alteration at all. Rather, it is a way the State may show that it has already
provided a reasonable accommodation.”).
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C. States Should Preserve the Sheltered Workshop Option
Elimination of sheltered workshops should play no part in a Title
II remedy. Eliminating sheltered workshops does not equate to
eliminating discrimination because discrimination lies in the denial of
access to community-based services, not in the resulting sheltered
workshop placement.147 Community-based services are not a onesize-fits-all solution, and states recognize this by offering both
options.148 There will always be individuals who are not qualified for
community-based services and others who may qualify but prefer
sheltered workshop placement.149 Olmstead recognizes states’ need
to maintain a range of services—some necessarily more restrictive
than others—to care for a diverse population of individuals with
disabilities.150 Some states may be concerned about the expense of
providing both services. Funding for employment services is,
however, typically attached to the individual and moves with the
individual.151 Thus, providing both services does not change the
aggregate amount spent on employment services.
Ultimately, sheltered workshops help to accomplish the aims of
the ADA, which defines “disability” as an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity.152 Employment is one of the
major life activities recognized under the ADA.153 If sheltered
workshops are eliminated, those individuals who are not qualified for
community-based services will be left with no options for
employment.154 Even individuals who are qualified for communitybased services may have difficulty securing employment during
147. See supra Part II.B.1–2.
148. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
149. See supra Part II.A. See, e.g., Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604–05 (“Some individuals . . . may need
institutional care from time to time . . . . For other individuals, no placement outside the institution may
ever be appropriate.”).
150. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605.
151. See, e.g., Lane v. Kitzhaber, No. 3:12-cv-00138-ST, 2014 WL 2807701, at *5 (D. Or. June 20,
2014) (discussing the structure of waiver funding: “[F]unding for employment services is attached to the
individual and moves with the individual. Thus, each individual in a sheltered workshop who chooses to
remain will continue to have his or her waiver funding allocated . . . even if other individuals elect to
allocate their funding for integrated employment services.”).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012).
153. Id. § 12102(2)(A).
154. See supra note 11.
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economic downturns and without sheltered workshops they will have
no fallback option.155 Eliminating sheltered workshops will
undoubtedly impair the employment options for many adults with
disabilities.
CONCLUSION
The jobs of V.J. Trombley and more than 50,000 other adults with
disabilities are at stake in the sheltered workshop debate.156 Various
disability advocacy groups oppose sheltered workshops, arguing that
they segregate and exploit adults with disabilities.157 On the other
side of the debate, supporters contend that sheltered workshops are
safer and can offer work commensurate with individuals’ capabilities
as well as various social benefits.158 Some individuals with
disabilities would prefer to receive community-based services like
supported employment instead of facility-based sheltered work. 159
One such group of individuals filed a class-action lawsuit, Lane v.
Kitzhaber, challenging their placement in sheltered workshops as
discrimination under ADA Title II.160
The Supreme Court’s holding in Olmstead is critical to analyzing a
Title II claim against sheltered workshops.161 Pursuant to Olmstead, a
Title II discrimination claim requires: (1) an individual with a
disability who is qualified for community based-services; (2) the
individual prefers community-based services; (3) the state offers
community-based services; (4) the individual is excluded from these
services.162 As this article shows, these elements pose certain
limitations on the scope of Title II claims against sheltered
workshops.163 Because the analysis centers on the qualifications and
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See supra note 26.
BUTTERWORTH ET. AL., supra note 4, at 25.
See supra note 8.
See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.
Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1200 (D. Or. 2012).
Id.
See generally Olmstead v. L.C ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
See supra Part II.A–B.
See supra Part II.D.
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desires of the individual, there is no discrimination where an
individual is not qualified for community-based services or where an
individual prefers sheltered workshop placement.164 This means that
a Title II claim cannot go so far as to declare all sheltered workshop
placements discriminatory.165 Furthermore, the fundamental
challenge of a Title II claim must be against the denial of an
alternative service; the individual’s placement in a sheltered
workshop is merely a consequence of that denial.166
Although a discrimination claim cannot encompass all individuals
in sheltered workshops, Title II still enables qualified individuals
who are denied access to community-based services to challenge
their own placements.167 With careful application of Olmstead, courts
can fashion remedies under Title II that will accommodate
individuals qualified for community-based employment options
without endangering sheltered workshops.168 The integration
mandate enacted pursuant to the ADA compels a finding of
discrimination where the individual is denied access to a more
integrated option like supported employment.169 A straightforward
application of Olmstead suggests that a state must provide
community-based services for the individuals who prefer these
services, subject to the resources available to the state and the needs
of others with disabilities.170 A court’s consideration of a state’s
resources and the needs of others with disabilities is an evaluation of
the state’s fundamental alteration defense, which is provided by the
regulations enacted pursuant to Title II.171 Because changes to state
services can take years to implement, Olmstead encourages deference
to transition plans and waiting lists developed by states.172

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
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See supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 600 (1999).
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2012); see also Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605–07.
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605–07.
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To avoid Title II claims, the most important action that states can
take is to design and implement an Olmstead plan to offer
community-based services to qualified individuals.173 If properly
implemented, an Olmstead plan can prevent future litigation. Should
litigation arise, courts owe a great deal of deference to the state’s
Olmstead plan as an aspect of the fundamental alteration defense.174
Courts must also take heed of Olmstead’s recognition of the state’s
need to maintain a range of services for adults with disabilities.175
The elimination of sheltered workshops is contrary to the aims of
Olmstead and is wholly unnecessary to avoiding discrimination in
employment services.176 Olmstead recognizes that states must
maintain a range of services—some necessarily more restrictive than
others—to care for a diverse population of individuals with
disabilities.177 Community-based services like supported employment
are not appropriate for all individuals with disabilities.178 A state can
help more of its citizens with disabilities reach their potential by
offering a choice between supported employment and sheltered
workshop placement.179
Proper application of Olmstead should leave sheltered workshops
undisturbed. However, protection from a Title II claim does not
guarantee their continued existence.180 Although early rulings in
Lane v. Kitzhaber respect the existence of sheltered workshops for
certain individuals,181 Oregon is poised to go beyond the potential
bounds of a Title II claim and eliminate sheltered workshops on its
own prerogative.182 Pressure from advocacy groups and the DOJ has
pushed other states toward eliminating sheltered workshops.183 Those
173. See supra Part III.B.
174. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605–07.
175. See id.
176. See discussion supra Part III.C.
177. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604–07.
178. See discussion supra Part III.C.
179. See discussion supra Part III.C.
180. See discussion supra Part II.E.
181. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1204 (D. Or. 2012).
182. Or. Exec. Order No. 13-04 (Apr. 16, 2013), available at http://www.oregon.gov/gov/docs/
executive_orders/eo_13-04.pdf. Governor Kitzhaber’s order requires that, by July 1, 2015, the state will
no longer purchase or fund any new sheltered workshop placements. Id.
183. See supra note 15.
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individuals who prefer sheltered workshops will be deprived of their
right to choose, and those who are not qualified for community-based
services will be deprived of employment services altogether. These
individuals will have no recourse under Title II due to the restrictions
against demanding a level of benefits.184

184. See supra Part II.E.
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